The problem of Social Learning in the Critical Theory of Habermas, Eder and Brunkhorst

Abstract

In the context of Critical Theory, a series of works have been developed with the aim of making plausible the idea of moral progress under the term of social learning. Taking as a starting point the work of Jürgen Habermas, they have sought to describe the change of moral reasoning in terms of universalist principles of judgement. Criticism against this proposal has led Klaus Eder and Hauke Brunkhorst to develop alternative approaches. This article argues that, in spite of their efforts, the works of these three authors have kept the assumption that historical moral changes may be described as a progressive development of a universalist logic. This assumption causes two problems: the use of teleological arguments that conceive as necessary the realization of moral principles; and restrictions of the kind of moral arguments that are considered relevant to explain social learning.